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Abstract
This Article discusses several developments concerning the position of the Commission in the
institutional structures of the European Union (”EU”) that have occurred since then. It does not
touch on the many other matters that influenced the debate on the draft Constitutional Treaty, lead-
ing to its failure at referendum in France and the Netherlands; these matters include the scope of
the draft Treaty, questions concerning its economic, social, and political benefits or disadvantages,
the working of the Stability Pact in the Eurozone and the ongoing debate on freedom of services
legislation, the purposes for which the EU was originally created and their modification, further
enlargement of the EU, and so on. These subjects require separate treatment.
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The Institute of European Affairs in Dublin published in
1995 Occasional Paper 7 by the present authors, entitled The Role
of the Commission and Qualified Majority Voting, which explained
that the European Commission was designed on the basis of me-
diation theory, specifically to provide a safeguard for the inter-
ests of minorities that might be harmed by qualified majority vot-
ing on new policy measures.' The Commission has been given
various other tasks, but this is the most important one since it
concerns new measures that the Member States have not previ-
ously accepted. The role of the Commission, exclusively author-
ized by the Rome Treaty to propose legislative measures to the
Council (and now also the European Parliament), is the key fea-
ture of what has since come to be called the "Community
Method."2
This Article discusses several developments concerning the
position of the Commission in the institutional structures of the
European Union ("EU") that have occurred since then. It does
not touch on the many other matters that influenced the debate
on the draft Constitutional Treaty, leading to its failure at refer-
endum in France and the Netherlands;3 these matters include
the scope of the draft Treaty, questions concerning its economic,
social, and political benefits or disadvantages, the working of the
Stability Pact in the Eurozone4 and the ongoing debate on free-
dom of services legislation, the purposes for which the EU was
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1. See JOHN TEMPLE LANG & EAMONN GALLAGHER, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
AND QUALIFIED MAJoITY VOTING 10-15 (Inst. of European Affairs, Occasional Paper No.
7, 1995).
2. See Eurojargon, http://europa.eu.int/abc/eurojargon/indexen.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2006).
3. See Ralph Atkins et al., Dutch Deal a Further Blow to EU Treaty, FIN. TIMES
(London),June 2, 2005, at 1.
4. See, e.g., MICHELE CHANG, REFORMING THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: SIZE AND
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originally created and their modification, further enlargement
of the EU, and so on. These subjects require separate treatment.
I. THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
Until recently, the larger member States nominated two
Commissioners. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) provided that,
following the next enlargement of the EU, the Commission
should be composed of one member from each Member State,
on condition that the system of voting in the Council be
changed.5 In effect the larger Member States agreed to give up
their second nominee in return for more votes in the Council.
II. THE TREATY OF NICE
The Commission proposed, before the Nice conference,
that it should no longer be composed of at least one nominee of
each Member State, although apparently it changed its mind
later.6 This was bad for the Commission but even more serious
for the smaller member States, which need a strong and effective
Commission; it was, therefore, bad for the European Community
as a whole because it would remove a necessary balancing mech-
anism between the larger and the smaller Member States.
The Treaty of Nice (2001)' provided that, with effect from
January 2005, the weighting of votes of the Member States would
be altered to give more voting power to the larger Member
States.' Two new requirements were added: in addition to a ma-
jority of 170 votes in the Council out of a total of 237, a qualified
INFLUENCE IN EMU POLICYMAKING (2005), http://aei.pitt.edu/3159/01/Chang_2005_
EUSA.paper.pdf.
5. See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, Protocol
on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union art. 1, O.J.
C 340/1, at 111 (1997) (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC
Treaty).
6. See The Strained European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at A26.
7. Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establish-
ing the European Communities and certain related acts, Mar. 10, 2001, O.J. C 80/1
(2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending TEU, EC Treaty, ECSC Treaty, and
Euratom Treaty and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
8. See id., Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union art. 3(1), OJ. C
80/1, at 50 (2001).
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majority must include at least sixty-two percent of the total popu-
lation of the EU and must include a majority of the Member
States. 9
Also, a protocol on enlargement attached to the Nice Treaty
provided that, when the EU reaches twenty-seven Member
States, the number of members of the Commission should be
lower than the number of Member States, the exact number to
be decided then by the Council acting unanimously. 10 The
members of the Commission are to be chosen according to a
system of rotation as yet not formulated but meant to treat all
Member States equally; and each Commission should reflect the
demographic and geographical range of all the Member States."
This is the Treaty provision that is now legally in being, although
not yet acted upon. It is important and it is that this is not an
agreement to agree. The Protocol automatically reduces the size
of the Commission, although it does not say by how much. Only
amendment or repeal of the Protocol can alter this. Unless
there is an agreement on the reduced number of Commission-
ers, the Commission would not be properly constituted.
This proposed change in the number of Commissioners, if
carried through, would be a serious mistake in at least three re-
spects:
1. it would add a new layer of complexity to an institutional
structure that is already a patchwork quilt of illogical com-
promises and which is far from the clarity and relative simplic-
ity of the Commission as an autonomous and representative
mediator;
2. it would make the Commission, for the first time, less than
fully representative. At any one time there will always be
Member States in a position to say that, unlike other Member
States, they are not in any sense participants in the Commis-
sion-and that therefore, in its proposals, the Commission is
9. See id.
10. See id., Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union art. 4(2), O.J. C
80/1, at 52 (2001). It has been suggested that if the Council fails to reach a decision,
the Commission could continue with a full membership (i.e., twenty-seven or more).
As this would not be consistent with the relevant Treaty provisions it is certain that the
matter would come before the European Court. For example, a corporation could
challenge a fine imposed by a Commission on the ground that the Commission was
improperly constituted.
11. See Treaty of Nice, supra note 7, Protocol on the enlargement of the European
Union art. 4(2)-(3), O.J. C 80/1, at 52 (2001).
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not in a position to deal equitably with their interests; this
could by itself be used to cast doubt on the validity of the
proposals.
3. The Commission is one of the three European Community
("EC") institutions that are necessarily and always involved in
the Community legislative process. It would be unjustifiable,
as a matter of principle, for a legislative institution to be with-
out a nominee of every Member State at all times.
In the preparations for Nice, the Commission paid lip ser-
vice to the "Community Method," which necessitates a Commis-
sion of the traditional kind.12 But the Commission itself under-
estimated the need for it to be fully representative of all the
Member States. It suggested 13 that one Commissioner per Mem-
ber State would lead to an expanded college that would have to
be differently organized, by modifying the present strict rules for
collective decision-making based on the equal status of all Com-
missioners (formal decisions by the Commission are made by
simple majority of the whole Commission). The Commission
proposed, in regard to the future nomination of fewer Commis-
sioners than the number of Member States, "a system of rotation
that would treat all Member States strictly equally" because "what
gives the Commission its cohesiveness and legitimacy is its opera-
tion as a collective body."1 4 Nevertheless, the Commission recog-
nized that one Commissioner from each Member State meant
that citizens "more easily understand the role the Commission
plays in European integration."15
This and other confused and indecisive Commissioner state-
ments understated the case for a Commission nominee from
each Member State and overestimated the objections. The state-
ment emphasized the Commission's less important executive
functions rather than its primary policy-forming/mediating
roles.16 The Member State governments have always considered
12. Cf Markus G. Puder, Salade Nicoise from Amsterdam Left-Overs-Does the Treaty of
Nice Contain the Institutional Recipe to Ready the European Union for Enlargement?, 8 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 53, 62-63 (2002).
13. See Commission of the European Communities, Adapting the Institutions to
Make a Success of Enlargement, COM (2000) 34 Final, at 10-12 (Jan. 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_0034enO
1.pdf.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 11 ("The Commission is the Community's executive, taking enforce-
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that, although the Commissioner they nominate does not re-
present them, it is important that the standpoint of each Mem-
ber State should be understood by at least one member of the
Commission at all times. Moving away from this clear and funda-
mental principle would certainly undermine the Commission.
When an institution does not know its own raison d'etre,
there is a risk that others will believe that it no longer has one.
The Commission did not say that there would not be enough real
jobs for twenty-five or more Commissioners: as the EU becomes
more active in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
("CFSP") and Justice and Home Affairs ('jHA") areas (now
called police and judicial cooperation), there is plenty to do. In-
deed the Commission's stated concern was only about its inter-
nal decision-making procedures. This was not and is not a suffi-
cient reason for fundamental change.
The case for having one Commissioner from each Member
State is most compelling in relation to the Commission's role in
initiating legislation, but the need for full representativeness and
autonomy applies to its other functions as well.
III. THE PROPOSALS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SIZE OF
THE COMMISSION
At the Convention and at the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence and European Councils following it in 2003/2004,17 there
were essentially two conflicting views regarding the size of the
Commission:
- the Commission should be composed of one nominee from
each Member State, irrespective of the number of Member
States, and this is essential for the Commission's policy-propos-
ing tasks and for its law enforcing role for the foreseeable fu-
ture as well as for ensuring that all member States have full
confidence in the Commission at all times;18 and all Commis-
ment action, implementing the budget and managing Community policies and
programmes.").
17. See Work of the IGC 2003/2004, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/cig2004/in-
dex-en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
18. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, has said:
Experience shows that, for the large majority of countries, the European Com-
mission is the person who reassures, who guarantees that the situation of his/
her country of origin is taken into consideration in Brussels, and, conversely, is
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sioners should have equal votes; 19
- the larger Member States have repeatedly argued that a Com-
mission of more than approximately fifteen members would be
too large to be efficient; that Commissioners are not there to
represent the interests of the Member States nominating them,
so there does not need to be one from each State; and that it
would be wrong to treat Luxembourg (population 460,000) in
the same way as Germany (population eighty-two million) in
this respect.
20
The Convention proposal that some States (maximum fif-
teen) should nominate voting members of the Commission for
the person who can explain to the government of his nationality all the ins
and outs of each dossier.
Jacques Delors-Agence Europe Exclusive Interview, BULL. QUOTIDIEN EUR. (BeIg.), Apr. 29,
2003, at 3. The Commission apparently now believes that there should be one Commis-
sioner per Member State. But before Nice Commissioners took the view that the status
quo was not an option and that the small States had to accept both "senior" and "jun-
ior" Commissioners or rotation of nominees. The entire discussion since before Nice
has been confused because the Commission did not have a consistent position and did
not seem to understand clearly what is its raison d'iftre. See generally JOHN TEMPLE LANG,
THE COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER NICE (2001); JOHN TEMPLE
LANG, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2000); John Tem-
ple Lang, The Commission: The Key to the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, 26 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1598 (2003) [hereinafter Key to the Constitutional Treaty]; John Temple Lang,
Community Constitutional Law, in CONSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 124
(Brigid Laffan ed., 1996); John Temple Lang, How Much Do the Smaller Member States
Need the European Commission?, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 315 (2002) (Gr. Brit.); John
Temple Lang, The Legal Aspects of the Two New "Pillars" Set Up by the Maastricht Treaty, in
CONSTITUTION-BuILDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra, app. at 217; John Temple
Lang, The Main Issues After the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, 27 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 544 (2004);John Temple Lang & Eamonn Gallagher, What Sort of Euro-
pean Commission Does the European Union Need?, 1 EUROPARATTSLIG TIDSKRII-r 81 (2002)
(Swed.); John Temple Lang, Institutional Changes in the European Union to Prepare for En-
largement: Which Role for the Commission?, ERA-F. (F.R.G.), Fall 2000, at 2, 2-9. For fur-
ther discussion, see also F. Lamoureux, La Constitution "Pnllope":. une refondation pour en
finiravec les repldtrages, 2003 REVUE DU DROIT DE L'UNION EUROPtENNE [REv. DR. EU] 13
(Fr.) (correctly describing the "Community Method" but omitting any reference to the
sole right of initiative in describing the role of the Commission); A. Mattera, Les zones
d'ombre du projet de Constitution dans l'architecture institutionnelle de l'Union: la composition
de la Commission, 2003 REv. DR. EU 5, 9 (Fr.) (assessing the Convention's proposals on
the Commission as a "solution facheuse pour grands et petits").
19. See Memorandum from Presidency to European Council 9 (Mar. 24, 2004),
http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/04/cgOO/cgOOO70.enO4.pdf.
20. See id.; see also VAL±RY GISCARD D'ESTAING ET AL., RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOST
POPULOUS AND THE LEAST POPULOUS STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1 (2003), http://
europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/other/othl3l1103_en.pdf; Memoran-
dum from Presidency to Delegations to the Intergovernmental Conference pt. 3 (May
13, 2004), http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/04/cgOO/cgOO075.enO4.pdf.
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five years and the others should nominate non-voting Commis-
sioners emerged, for the first time, towards the end of the Con-
vention. 21 This was in spite of the efforts of a loose group of the
smaller Member States called the "Friends of the Community
Method. 22
Therefore, the key issue was, and is, whether the Commis-
sion should be a fully representative body or a small, supposedly
more efficient, but not fully representative body.23
The second view clearly indicated what the Nice Treaty pro-
visions on the size of the Commission are likely to lead to-there
would be no point in having a Commission only one or two
members short of the number of Member States.
IV. THE PROPOSALS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE ON THE SIZE OF THE COMMISSION
The formula of "non-voting Commissioners" was rejected,
rightly, by the Intergovernmental Conference.24 Instead the
draft Treaty on the Constitution visualized a Commission of a
maximum of eighteen members when there are twenty-seven
Member States. 21 In that case, each Member State would have a
nominee for ten out of fifteen years, i.e., for two out of every
three five-year periods; two of the six largest Member States
would be without a nominee in each five-year period.26 How-
ever, these convenient figures, eighteen out of twenty-seven,
mask a real problem-that if and when the number of Member
States is a number like twenty-nine or thirty-one, it becomes
mathematically impossible to ensure equality of nominations to
the Commission in any reasonable number of five-year periods.
Although the number of Commissioners envisaged by the
21. See The Outcome of the European Convention, http://europa.eu.int/scad-
plus/european-convention/introductionen.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
22. See Paul Magnette & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Coping with the Lilliput Syndrome: Large
vs. Small Member States in the European Convention, 11 EUR. PUB. L. 85, 90 (2005) (Gr.
Brit.), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-ssfc0041/lilliputsyndrome2.pdf.
23. Commissioners are not "representatives" of the countries that nominated
them, but collectively represent the Union as a whole.
24. See The Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004: The Composition of the
Commission, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/cig2004/debatesl-en.htm#COMMIS-
SION (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
25. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-26, Dec. 16, 2004,
O.J. C 310/1, at 21 (2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
26. See id.
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draft Treaty is eighteen, no suggestions have yet been made and
no mechanism or formula has been mentioned to say how a
Commission of eighteen members could "reflect satisfactorily
the demographic and geographical range of all the Member
States, '27 twenty-seven or more very diverse entities. Presumably
the President and Foreign Minister would be treated as nomi-
nees of the States from which they came, in each five-year pe-
riod.
V. BUT HAS THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
REALLY CHANGED?
A rfsum6 of the arguments in favor of a smaller Commis-
sion begins with the assumption that the Commission's policy-
proposing role is no longer important since the EU no longer
needs to develop new policies, and that the Commission should
not be involved in developing new policies within the spheres of
foreign policy and justice and home affairs. This assumption
suggests that the law enforcing, quasi-judicial tasks of the Com-
mission and its responsibilities for handling the EU budget
(which are, inaccurately, referred to as "executive" tasks) are
now its only tasks and that a smaller Commission would perform
them more efficiently.
This view has formed for several reasons:
- there has been genuine and widespread ignorance, even
among members of the Commission and Commission officials,
about why the Commission was originally constituted as an au-
tonomous and fully representative institution. The role of an
independent policy-proposing mediator originated in media-
tion theory, not political science, and there was no European
equivalent of the Federalist Papers in the United States to ex-
plain it;
- there has been a deliberate effort, not least in the United King-
dom, to downplay the Commission's role by describing it as a
civil service, a secretariat, or an "executive," which ought
merely to be carrying out the instructions of the Parliament or
the Council, thus ignoring its primary role as a policy-propos-
ing think-tank and mediator;
- the Commission has three different functions. Each of them,
for different reasons, requires a fully representative Commis-
27. Id. art. 1-26(6)(b), O.J. C 310/1, at 22 (2004).
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sion equally independent of all the Member States. These are
policy-proposing, law enforcing, and managerial functions.28
Its policy-proposing tasks could be performed by a group com-
posed of one nominee policy-maker from each Member State;
its law enforcement tasks could be performed by a group of
lawyers and economists. But just as it is accepted that the
Court of Justice should consist of one judge from each Mem-
ber State, it should also be accepted that there ought to be one
nominee from each State for law enforcement tasks. For
budget and other managerial functions, however, it is said that
a smaller Commission would be more efficient. This latter as-
sumes that a smaller Commission, with nominees from only
some of the Member States at any time, would generally be
regarded as an impartial body. This is a crucial assumption; on
the face of it, it is most unlikely to be correct.
It is argued that the balance between the Commission's policy-
proposing role and its role in executing policy has shifted to-
wards executive functions, that a Commission of thirty cannot
be a collegiate executive, and that the Commission's executive
function should be further strengthened. The implication
seems to be that reducing the Commission, apparently for ex-
ecutive convenience, is desirable even if it involves sacrificing
the Commission's capacity for its more important tasks of pol-
icy-proposing or for law enforcement. Even less convincingly,
it has been suggested that the exclusion of nominees to the
Commission from a substantial number of Member States
could be balanced by compensatory arrangements to ensure
fair treatment. This compensation would be achieved through
some, presumably new, kind of accountability of the reduced
Commission to Parliament and Council-that is, by making
the Commission less autonomous as well as less representa-
tive-ignoring the fact that this would make it even less capa-
ble of providing a safeguard for minority interests;
- there is a view that the Commission no longer needs to pro-
pose new economic policies. This view assumes that because
the Single Market and an array of other EU policies have been
completed, the EU will not need to develop any new policies
for any purpose either within the EU or in its relations with the
28. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
42-43 (2d ed. 2002).
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rest of the world. It is self-evident that this view is wrong.
While much of the necessary policies have been put in place,
many of them are still incomplete, and almost all of them need
to be kept up-to-date and adapted to changing circumstances.
With ten new Member States and more to come, and with
rapid changes in the world economy foreseeable, revised policy
proposals, even if not completely new policies, will certainly be
needed. In addition, the EU will continue to need an impar-
tial body to handle international economic negotiations on its
behalf;
- it seems to be taken for granted that the Commission should
not be entrusted with responsibilities much beyond existing
First Pillar (mainly economic) competences, for example, that
it should not have a significant policy-proposing role in JHA
matters or in developing the EU's future CFSP.29 This is a par-
ticularly odd assumption, especially on the part of the smaller
Member States, as it lends support to the notion that the larger
Member States are better qualified to develop such policies
and can safely be entrusted with them for the EU as a whole.
In fact, a Commission of twenty-five or even thirty members
is not so large when it is kept in mind that:
- the more Member States there are, the more heterogeneous
the EU becomes, bringing with it more complex problems;
- policy issues of increasing complexity need to be considered by
the full range of national views that only a fully representative
Commission can provide;
- members of the Commission need to spend much more time
than they have done in the past explaining policy proposals to
national Parliaments and electorates-and not only their own;
- the recent accession of ten Member States and foreseeable fu-
ture enlargements will give rise to much more work than ear-
lier enlargements as the new Member States, and those to
come will require considerably more back-up from the Com-
mission than previous entrants, due to their relative lack of
preparedness for membership;
- there is already ample evidence that the Commission will have
greatly increased responsibilities in the areas of police and ju-
29. See generally Denis Chaibi, The Foreign Policy Thread in the European Labyrinth, 19
CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 362-66 (2004) (discussing the pillar structure of the EU).
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dicial cooperation.3"
It is not mathematically possible, as stated earlier, to have
nominees of more than four larger Member States as members
of the Commission in each five-year period under the eighteen/
twenty-seven formula (i.e., two of the larger Member States
would on average be without nominees), nor can the require-
ments of equality and representativeness of the relevant Nice,
Convention, and the Constitutional Treaty clauses be met. The
complexities and difficulties of implementing these formulations
appear to have been neither seen nor understood. In the Con-
vention, as in the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference
and European Council and previously at Nice, an inadequately
considered, simple-sounding, but essentially inoperable formula
was adopted.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
TREATY FORMULA
The first and most basic objection to the Constitutional
Treaty formula is that it misses the point. The issue is not
whether the Member States are treated equally but whether the
formula causes the Commission to be (or to be regarded as) an
unsatisfactory mediator. If it does, then it would not matter that
the States were all treated equally, even if that were technically
true. A Commission on which one-third or more of the Member
States have no nominees is highly unlikely to be seen as an im-
partial mediator, representative of the whole EU and equally in-
dependent of all the Member States; it is much more likely that
the formula would be seen to prevent the Commission from ful-
filling its role satisfactorily. The fact that the formula was ac-
cepted suggests either that it was not carefully considered, or
that those who accepted it did not understand the Commission's
role in the "Community Method," or did not think it important
that the Commission would be unsatisfactory. All three explana-
tions are probably correct, but for different actors.
The Commission does not merely initiate or propose poli-
cies. As explained in Occasional Paper 7, it also acts as a
facilitator and mediator between Member States when they disa-
30. See, e.g., Daniel T. Murphy, Closer or Enhanced Cooperation: Amsterdam or Nice, 31
GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265 (2003) (discussing enhanced police and judicial coopera-
tion).
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gree, and between the Council and the Parliament when their
views need to be reconciled, as they do increasingly often in co-
decision procedures." a The Commission's roles in these respects
are essential to make the EU work smoothly, and indeed to make
it work at all. These tasks will be more necessary than ever in the future
with twenty-seven or more Member States. For these continuing roles
the Commission must be, and must be seen clearly to be, indis-
putably objective and impartial in a way that a Commission com-
posed of only eighteen members could not be.
In addition, it is hard to imagine any large Member State
accepting that the Commission could possibly "reflect satisfacto-
rily the demographic and geographical range of all the Member
States"32 if it had no nominee. When the U.K. and either France
or Germany (or any two or three larger member States) are with-
out nominees, it is impossible to imagine that they will accept
that the Commission "reflects" them adequately or at all.
Whatever compromises might ultimately be devised, it is ob-
viously impossible to design any Commission of eighteen mem-
bers that would "reflect satisfactorily" an EU of twenty-seven or
more very different States.
This would mean that at any one time, the Commission
would lack the confidence of one-third or more of the Member
States. In the long term, this means that the Commission, and
therefore the "Community Method," will be considered unsatis-
factory.
The second, simple and fundamental, objection to both the
Nice Protocol and the Constitution formula is that they are
based ostensibly on a "principle of equality." It is unrealistic to
believe that a small Member State without a nominee is "equal,"
in any meaningful sense, to a large Member State without a nom-
inee. The larger Member States have many means to ensure that
their interests are taken into account at all times, while smaller
Member States lack the weight to ensure this. Much has been
made of the fact that the six most populous States (with more
than thirty-eight million inhabitants each) represent seventy-
four percent of the EU population.33 It is, however, inconsistent
with this argument to assume that any two or three large States
31. See TEMPLE LANG & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 10-11, 21.
32. Draft Treaty, supra note 25, art. 1-26(6)(b), 0.J. C 310/1, at 22 (2004).
33. See GISCARD D'ESTAING ET AL., supra note 20, at 3.
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representing thirty to forty percent of the population3 4 can be
expected to accept that a Commission excluding their nominees
in any five-year period "reflects" all the States.
The argument of "legal equality" of States is a naive self-
deception for small States that have not yet seen the harm done
to the "Community Method" and their own interests by the Nice
Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty formulas. This may explain
the failure of some of the smaller States to understand the signif-
icance and ill-effects of the proposal. This self-deception, how-
ever, is unlikely to last as it becomes increasingly clear that:
- the proposal would give States, in particular larger Member
States, an excuse to object to Commission proposals and deci-
sions (e.g., on State aids) 5 that they dislike, on the ground
that they had been adopted by a Commission that was insuffi-
ciently representative of the whole EU;
- the objection that the Constitution formula gives more influ-
ence to the larger States is made more serious because it also
proposes a re-weighting of the votes in the Council in favor of
the larger States. Until now, smaller States had votes out of
proportion to their populations. As the scope of majority vot-
ing and co-decision by the Parliament seems likely to widen
further, the need for the safeguard provided by the Commis-
sion (which is needed precisely because of demographically
justified majority voting in the other two legislative institu-
tions) becomes even greater.
All this has several other consequences. First, it lowers the
status of the Commission, because at any time one-third or more
34. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing repeatedly pointed out that Germany has a larger popu-
lation than California, and that Luxembourg and Malta have populations smaller than
Rhode Island. In Europe, apart from the six large States with seventy-four percent of
the population, there are eight States (Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Swe-
den, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) having populations of between eight
million and sixteen million, forming together nineteen percent of the total, and eleven
smaller States (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Malta), which only represent seven percent of the popu-
lation. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK (2005), available at http:/
/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. But the Convention proposal means,
among other odd results, that the three Baltic States (seven million inhabitants) will
always have one voting nominee in the Commission, while the eighty-two million
Germans will not.
35. In 2001, State aids in the fifteen Member States amounted to eighty-six billion
Euros, almost as much as the EU budget. The importance of effective control by the
Commission of this flow of money is self-evident.
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of the Member States will not feel confidence in it. Second, it
reduces the safeguard for the smaller Member States, which has
so far been provided under the "Community Method" by a Com-
mission composed of nominees from each Member State.
This is not surprising. The Commission was the only institu-
tion'that the larger Member States wished to reduce in size be-
cause the Commission was the institution whose authority they
wished to weaken. The U.K. was frank about this, and the fact
that this was the long-term French objective also became very
clear. The argument made at one stage that larger Member
States ought to have nominees in the Commission at all times
showed that the larger States were indifferent to even formal
equality of States in this respect.
The proposal to reduce the size of the Commission is an
unfortunate example of what the Convention was intended to
avoid: an ill-considered, illogical compromise instead of a ra-
tional legal construction. Nobody setting out to write a Constitu-
tion would have devised such a complex, unsatisfactory, and
clumsy arrangement. This was partly due to the fact that the in-
stitutional issues were the only ones that were not carefully pre-
pared and considered by a working group within the Conven-
tion.3 6
Another less obvious disadvantage of the Constitutional
Treaty proposal is that it will make it harder to find suitably ex-
perienced Presidents of the Commission. A potential President
could be chosen only from those eighteen member States that
have the right to nominate in the next five-year period; those left
out cannot propose a candidate from their own States. Very
often it would be better to appoint as President someone who
had previously been a Commissioner, although Heads of State
36. Apparently the Convention did not ask for a working group on institutional
questions, but that did not prevent the Praesidium from setting one up. Because the
Commission was never united on consistent and clear policy on its own composition
and appointment, the natural majority in the Praesidium in favor of the Commission
gradually broke up, and Mr. Dehaene in particular came to control what the Commis-
sion proposed. See Kirsty Hughes, A Dynamic and Democratic EU or Muddling Through
Again? Assessing the EU's Draft Constitution 6, 12 (European Policy Inst. Network, Work-
ing Paper No. 8, 2003), available at http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?itemid=1052
(rightly criticizing the inadequacy of the institutional debate in the Convention, and
describing non-voting Commissioners as an "unhappy compromise," and the overall
institutional compromise as "a recipe for ongoing turf fighting and confusion").
THE COMMISSION
and Government have shown little appreciation of this, and
seem to prefer to nominate someone from among themselves.
A longer-term but even more serious consequence of the
unrepresentative nature of a reduced Commission is that the
Commission's sole right to propose legislative measures (which
is essential to make majority voting acceptable) is likely to be put
into question. The European Parliament itself encroaches on
the "Community Method." Many parliamentarians ask why an
unelected body should have the sole right of legislative initia-
tive." The answer (that the Commission safeguards the interests
of minorities, which the Parliament cannot do) seems to have
been forgotten, and would be less convincing in any case if it
comes from an unrepresentative Commission. The lip service
paid by the Convention to the "Community Method" will not re-
call it.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NICE TREATY FORMULA FOR
THE NEXT ENLARGEMENT
It seems likely that the next enlargement of the EU will in-
volve only Bulgaria and Romania38 (perhaps, further down the
line, western Balkan States and Turkey will be admitted)." At
that point it will be necessary to decide (unless the Nice Treaty
protocol is amended or repealed) how many Commissioners
there should be, and which Member States will be the first to
lose their right to nominate a Commissioner under the Nice
Treaty (or the Constitutional Treaty if it is ratified). After each
future enlargement more States will lose their right to nominate
a Commissioner in each five-year period, and equality of nomi-
nation among Member States cannot be mathematically main-
tained except over such a long time as to be essentially meaning-
less. Those who endorsed this process failed to see even into the
near future. The jockeying for position that would ensue, with
consequential effects on the credibility of the exercise, will be
37. See, e.g., Elisabeth Zoller, The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the
Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391, 394-96
(2005).
38. See Draft Treaty, supra note 25, Declaration concerning the Protocol on the
transitional provisions relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union, O.J. C 310/
1, at 470 (2004).
39. See Stefan Wagstyl, EBRD Chief Warns Against Enlargement Confusion, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 24, 2005, at 8.
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recurrent and will exasperate electorates, and be incomprehensi-
ble to them.
VIII. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE COMMISSION
AND THE "COMMUNITY METHOD"
Several steps that have not involved Treaty changes have
weakened or eroded the "Community Method" in a number of
ways quite apart from actual or proposed Treaty provisions4":
- in the co-decision procedure, when majorities in Council and
Parliament agree, they can amend a Commission proposal, at
the conciliation stage, without the Commission's agreement.
This is now the most commonly used legislative procedure for
the First Pillar matters;41
- the President of the Commission, and the Commission as a
whole, now must be approved by the Parliament before they
take office. 42 This makes the Commission much less indepen-
dent from the majority in the Parliament than it was, and than
it was intended to be;
- the President has also acquired the power to obtain the resig-
nations of members of the Commission without giving reasons
and without judicial review, but subject to the agreement of
the whole Commission.4 3 An obvious result of this is that the
President could come under pressure from the majority in the
Parliament to get rid of an individual Commissioner whom the
majority disliked, although the Parliament has (and should
have) no direct power to remove individual Commissioners
from office. The President undertakes to "consider seriously
whether he should request that Member to resign" if the Par-
liament has expressed a lack of confidence in a member of the
40. Magnette & Nicolaidis say that the Treaty for a Constitution "implies a revision
of the founding model which sacrifices some of its major features." Magnette & Nico-
laidis, supra note 22, at 86. Later they say that the Convention made the divide between
large and small Member States "more visible than ever before in the Union's history."
Id. at 92. This was largely due to Valdry Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac. Mr.
Nicolas Sarkozy, who is a prominent candidate to become the next President of France,
goes considerably further by proposing that the six largest member States should be-
come the motor of the Union so that "Europe would act . . .under the impulse of
responsible politicians, not anonymous bureaucrats." John Thornhill, Sarkozy in Callfor
"Hard Core 6" to Lead EU, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 26, 2005, at 14.
41. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 28, at 99-100.
42. See id. at 43.
43. See id.
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Commission.4 4 This weakens the independence and collegial-
ity of all the members of the Commission;
- the Parliament has tried by formal agreement with the Com-
mission to obtain the right to require individual Commission-
ers to resign. This is contrary to the principle of the collegial-
ity of the Commission and to the President's right to get indi-
vidual Commissioners to resign only if the other
Commissioners agree;4
5
- the formal agreement also obliges the Commission to re-ex-
amine proposals rejected by the Parliament and to explain the
reasons if it decides to maintain its proposal. This gives Parlia-
ment a power to obstruct even where it has no right of co-deci-
sion;
- there is now a High Representative of the EU for foreign policy
and security purposes whose status is effectively considered su-
perior to that of the Commissioner for External Relations.4 6
In addition to these formal institutional changes, several
other changes have been made that have weakened the Commis-
sion and therefore weakened the "Community Method" and the
safeguards it provides:
- the apparent understanding at European Council level that
Presidents of the Commission should be chosen from among
Heads of State or Government unduly restricts choice and em-
phasizes their intention to control the principal representative
of the Commission, who is likely to be constrained by agree-
44. European Parliament, Rules of Procedure R. 10, O.J. L 44/1, at 119 (2004).
45. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 217, O.J. C 325/33, at 121 (2002).
46. Sir Brian Crowe says that because the EU Foreign Minister would also be Vice-
President of the Commission for External Relations "by transgressing the separation of
powers inherent in the EU's institutional arrangements until now, it will cause frictions
which the incumbent will be hard put to manage." BRIAN CROWE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF
EUROPE, at vii (2005), available at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/395.pdf. He later indicates
how serious and confusing this "transgression" would be, by pointing out, without com-
ment, that the Foreign Minister "is to have his own bureaucratic support in an External
Action Service answerable to him as Minister and composed of officials from the Coun-
cil Secretariat, Commission, and member states." Id. at 3. Crowe, writing diplomatically
but skeptically, and confining his comments to the subject of the Foreign Minister,
revealingly describes the difficulties and tensions inevitable in an institutional structure
in which roles are so confused and lacking in coherence.
See Alan Dashwood, The Draft EU Constitution-First Impressions, 5 CAMBRIDGE Y.B.
EUR. LEGAL STUD. 395, 414-15 (2002); Alan Dashwood & Angus Johnston, The Institu-
tions of the Enlarged EU Under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty, 41 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 1481, 1503-04 (2004) (Gr. Brit.).
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ments entered into in his previous role, e.g., the current Presi-
dent's acquiescence in the draft Constitutional Treaty;
- the resources of the Commission for permanent staff have
been repeatedly reduced in relation to its responsibilities,
which have greatly increased in geographical scope and in
complexity, most recently as a result of the accession of ten
new Member States.4 7 Salary levels in the Commission have
been, relatively, reduced and this is likely to continue.48 Apart
from making the Commission under-resourced and over-
worked, this has led to its being weakened in another way: an
increasing number of the officials working in the Commission
at any one time are national civil servants on secondment. 49
These civil servants cannot be expected to be independent of
their national administrations, and of course they are not. The
Commission as a whole is therefore both weaker and less inde-
pendent.
- Changes suggested in the draft Treaty for a Constitution con-
cerning a long-term European Council President50 and a
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs51 are likely to have similar
effects. In both cases the terms of office and relationship with
the Presidency of the Commission are sufficiently vague as to
suggest as little accountability as possible. For example, the
EU3 of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom dealt with
Iran, ostensibly as the European Union, but with no clear man-
date and no Commission participation.52
In short, the independence of the Commission has been
weakened both by the increased powers of the Parliament over it
in the areas in which both institutions operate and by govern-
ments' steps to reduce the Commission's effectiveness and influ-
ence. As a result, the safeguards that the Commission is in-
tended to provide have been eroded.
Some of the erosion of the "Community Method" has re-
47. See The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-Member EU, http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e5017.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).




50. See Draft Treaty, supra note 25, art. 1-22, O.J. C 310/ 1, at 20 (2004).
51. See id. art. 1-28, O.J. C 310/1, at 23 (2004).
52. See ALDo ZAMMIT BORDA, IRAN AND THE EU3 NEGOTATIONS 7 (2005), http://
www.uaces.org/E53Borda.pdf.
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sulted from the Parliament's efforts to obtain greater powers. It
is not clear how far the Parliament understood the serious conse-
quences of what it was doing. Some Members of the European
Parliament ("MEPs") certainly have talked as if they did not un-
derstand that there was any reason for the autonomy of the
Commission and as if there was no reason for the Commission's
exclusive power to propose First Pillar measures.5 3 Parliament
has weakened the Commission, and therefore weakened the
Community, without increasing its own powers vis-A-vis the Coun-
cil.
But even the cumulative effects of all these changes may be
less damaging to the European Union in the long term than the
fact that the "Community Method" has deliberately not been
adopted in several areas, in particular in the area of Common
Foreign and Security Policy, in which the draft Constitutional
Treaty did not even confirm the Commission's existing concur-
rent power to make proposals.
IX. COMMENTARY AMD CONCLUSIONS
A. Future Use of the "Community Method"
The proposed reduction in the number of Commissioners
and the presumably intended and inevitable reduction in the
standing of the Commission have serious long-term implications.
As already explained, a fully representative Commission equally
independent of all the Member States is essential to the "Com-
munity Method." For some years to come the EU will take eco-
nomic decisions according to the "Community Method" and for-
eign policy and security measures according to the intergovern-
mental method; justice and home affairs issues will remain in an
intermediate zone. The devaluation of the Commission necessa-
rily devalues the "Community Method" and so makes it less likely
that, whenever the EU decides to take all kinds of decisions by
one method, the "Community Method" (or some variation of it)
will be adopted.
This is extremely unfortunate. When the European Com-
munity was organized in the 1950s the "Community Method" was
considered essential for several reasons. First, as already ex-
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plained, it was necessary to make majority voting on important
matters acceptable, both in principle and in practice. Second,
it was necessary to have a fully representative and independent
Commission in order to create an institutional structure in
which large and small Member States could co-exist satisfacto-
rily.55 That had never previously been possible, and is not now
possible, on an intergovernmental basis. Devaluing the Commis-
sion and the "Community Method" devalues the key feature that
made the Community effective and which made it acceptable
even to Member States that were outvoted. What has been un-
fortunately agreed is likely to make the EU both ineffective (be-
cause States without voting nominees will be less likely to accept
Commission proposals and decisions) and unacceptable (be-
cause States will be less likely to accept being outvoted).
It will always be unsatisfactory for the EU to have two en-
tirely different decision-making procedures-whatever their ex-
act scope. The foreign and security procedure provides neither
the legal nor the political safeguards that exist for First Pillar
matters under the "Community Method." Nobody drafting a ra-
tional constitutional structure would knowingly create such a sit-
uation, because it can only lead to controversy over which proce-
dure properly applies. Furthermore, there will always be a temp-
tation for Member States in a hurry to favor use of the
intergovernmental procedure, which does not require a Com-
mission proposal or Parliamentary discussion and is not subject
to legal challenge in the Community Courts.56 Examples exist
already.57
B. What Has Gone Wrong?
It is important to grasp several points about all this:
- the Commission was invented to do a job. It was not invented
for its own sake or for the purpose of having a new powerful
54. See TEMPLE LANG & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 37.
55. See id. at 23-25.
56. See Panos Koutrakos, Constitutional Idiosyncrasies and Political Realities: The
Emerging Security and Defense Policy of the European Union, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 69, 72
(2003) (noting that with respect to intergovernmental procedures under the Common
Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP"), the "Commission... does not enjoy the exclusive
right of legislative initiative, while the role of the European Parliament is significandy
limited").
57. See generally id. (discussing use of intergovernmental procedures).
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institution in Europe. The Commission's powers are to pro-
pose new legislative measures, to execute negotiating directives
given to it by the Council, and to apply existing rules;
- the Commission's independence is a political safeguard for the
objectivity of its proposals. There is no legal method of ensur-
ing that its proposals are always wise or well thought out: the
merits of proposals are not justiciable. Wisdom cannot be leg-
islated for;
- the independent Commission provides a safeguard for small
Member States and for minority interests, against unwise or
harmful new policies of majorities or larger Member States,
and against the possibility of domination by larger Member
States;
- the Commission ensures that the rules that have been adopted
are obeyed by all the Member States and not only by the
smaller ones;
- the "Community Method" was carefully designed, legally and
politically. Together with judicial control of all acts with legal
effects adopted by the Community institutions, it provides
comprehensive safeguards for all minority interests in a diverse
Community. It ensures that when Community measures have
been adopted, they are carried out even by large Member
States, which may have voted against them;
- no other method of safeguarding minority interests has ever
been suggested, except requiring unanimity. But it is well un-
derstood that requiring unanimity, except for very important
decisions, would lead to inertia and impotence.
This is not a question of traditional "separation of powers"
into legislative, executive, and judicial. The "Community
Method" is more precisely designed than that, but because it is
not clearly understood it is easy to erode it without the signifi-
cance of the changes being immediately noticed.
C. The Significance of the Composition of the Commission for
Future Referenda
It is likely that future Treaty changes will be the subject of
referenda in at least some Member States. This has several im-
portant implications:
- it cannot be assumed that the present degree of ignorance
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about the role of the Commission in the "Community Method"
will continue;
- no formula is possible to make a Commission composed of
nominees of two-thirds or less of the Member States "reflect"
all of them. Certainly no formula could be imagined that an
electorate would find clear or satisfactory. Electorates will,
rightly, understand simply that their country will no longer
have a Commissioner, for five years at a time;
- no intelligent electorate will accept that a small State without a
nominee Commissioner is "equal" to a large State without one;
- all electorates will understand without difficulty that their
Member States will lose their rights to nominate Commission-
ers, and will be almost certain to object, and to vote against the
governments which gave up this right and against the referen-
dum proposal in question;
- electorates can no longer be expected to take on trust what
their political leaders propose. They will want explanations
and they are likely to discuss thoroughly what a new Treaty ac-
tually says. No doubt there will be, as there were in past refer-
enda, misrepresentations by those opposed to the EU. But no-
body will be able to argue convincingly that a Commission of
nominees from two-thirds or less of the member States is a sat-
isfactory Commission;
- at Laeken, before the Convention, it was stated that one of the
aims of Treaty reform was greater transparency and compre-
hensibility. 58 That is still desirable, but neither the Constitu-
tional Treaty provisions nor the Nice Treaty provisions can pro-
vide it;
- transparency makes it necessary to explain, among other
things, the raison d'etre of the Commission. Once explained,
it is not difficult to understand. Proper explanations would
help to make the EU institutions seem less remote and less
complicated;
- future referenda may not be about a whole new Treaty, in
which undesirable features might be accepted to avoid a veto
of the whole. They are likely to involve a small number of spe-
58. See C~cile Barbier, Laeken Declaration, TOMORROW EUR. (Observatoire Soc.
Europeen, Brussels, BeIg.), Dec. 2001, at 1, http://europa.eu.int/constitution/
futurum/documents/contrib/contOO1201_en.pdf.
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cific changes, the merits or demerits of which will be clearly
visible;
- the divergence between the interests of the larger and the
smaller Member States is the basic institutional problem of the
EU. The problem cannot be solved by giving the larger Mem-
ber States the predominant influence in the Commission that
they increasingly have in the Council and through the Parlia-
ment, as the smaller member States cannot be expected to ac-
quiesce in this. This is a much more serious problem in the
EU than it was in the United States in 1776, for various rea-
sons.59 A properly constituted Commission is the only way the
problem of size differences in the EU can be contained.
Broadly, each of the following institutional scenarios is pos-
sible in theory:
- repeal or modify the Nice Treaty protocol formula;
- continue on the basis of the Nice Treaty and implement any
non-controversial parts of the Treaty for a Constitution;
- persuade the French and Dutch peoples to approve the Treaty
for a Constitution, in new referenda, and follow with referenda
in all the other Member States that had planned them;
- negotiate a Treaty limited essentially to institutional matters;
- negotiate a wholly new Treaty.
The issues discussed in this Article would arise, sooner or
later, in each of these situations, although in different contexts
and in different forms.
D. A Lesson from the Negotiations on the EU Treaties
The European Community Treaties as originally written
provided well-considered and complete legal and political safe-
guards, based on the Commission and the "Community
Method," for First Pillar matters. However, recent Treaty negoti-
ations, summarized here, have revealed a procedural weakness
that had not previously been noticeable.
Any institutional arrangements that provide a system of safe-
guards or checks and balances necessarily create a degree of ten-
sion among the institutions and entities involved. It is therefore
a defect in the system when revision of Treaty provisions can be
carried out by one of the groups of institutions and entities
59. See Temple Lang, Key to the Constitutional Treaty, supra note 18, at 1615-17.
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whose powers the Treaties are intended to limit. This is the posi-
tion in the European Union. Treaty amendments can be agreed
between the governments of Member States without being pro-
posed by the Commission or discussed in detail by the European
Parliament. The events of the last few years have shown that
Treaty amendments can be seriously ill-considered and can be
imposed, as some features of the Nice Treaty were imposed, by a
large member State holding the Presidency even when the pro-
posed changes are seriously unsatisfactory (not least from the
point of view of that State itself).6o These events also show that
at least some governments will use any discussion of Treaty
changes to alter the balance that the "Community Method" was
carefully designed to guarantee. The Nice Treaty negotiations
also show how profoundly unsatisfactory it can be when Heads of
State and Government improvise forms of words at the last mo-
ment, such as the formula about equality of Member States in
the rotation of Commissioners,6 a whose complexities have not
been seriously considered.
The Convention (an idea that had never been tried before
but which, in principle, is an attractive one) did not overcome
this weakness. The Convention failed to deal satisfactorily with
institutional issues concerning the Commission, partly because it
did not even set up a committee or working group to consider
them. The result was the wholly ridiculous idea of non-voting
"Commissioners" 62 and other proposals inconsistent with the
"Community Method," which some prominent members of the
Convention either did not understand or did not wish to main-
tain.
No doubt, when negotiations to get out of the present im-
passe resume, as they may do before the end of 2006, some
States will want to maintain their negotiating gains, however de-
structive they may be of the EU's capacity to maintain a neces-
sary harmony between the divergent interests of its Member
States. It is for the smaller Member States that wish to retain the
protection of the "Community Method" to prepare the ground
for the future debate. In particular, they need to be wary of last
60. See Thomas Fuller, In a Europe of 25 Equals, No Consensus on a Charter, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at 4 (noting disproportionate voting power under the Treaty of
Nice).
61. See supra notes 11, 14 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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minute proposals-for example, permanent membership of the
Commission for the nominees of the six largest Member States
(the others rotating temporary places among themselves) in re-
turn for amending the Nice formula for Council votes that over-
favored Spain and Poland. While there is an obvious case for
relating votes in the Council to population size, there is no simi-
lar case for diminishing the Commission.
Unfortunately, in the last few years, the importance and role
of the Commission in the "Community Method" have not been
understood, even by members of the Commission and certainly
not by members of the Parliament. The "Community Method"
has been weakened in a number of ways and, in a number of
new areas of European Union activity, Member States have delib-
erately chosen not to adopt the "Community Method" but with-
out adopting any other kind of safeguard, whether political or
legal.
The introduction to Occasional Paper 7, written eleven
years ago, noted that "[e]xperience had ... shown that no con-
struction based on sovereignty expressed intergovernmentally-
such as had been tried in the Council of Europe and the League
of Nations and found wanting-could for long contain and
defuse divergent interests. '"63
Under pressure at Nice and in the Convention on the fu-
ture of Europe, this lesson appears to have been ignored by the
principal authors of both-respectively the current and a former
President of France.
63. TEMPLE LANG & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 9.
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